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i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990494-CA 
v. : 
RANDOLPH CARPENTER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals his conviction of one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine), a second-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-82 (1998). 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where no meritorious grounds for suppression of evidence 
existed, was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel when 
his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress or a 
memorandum supporting defendant's pro se motion? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal is 
reviewed as a matter of law. See State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993); 
State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Cosey. 873 P.2d 1177,1179 
(Utah App. 1994). However, "[djespite the application of a standard normally bereft of 
deference, appellate review of trial counsel's performance must be highly deferential; 
otherwise, the 'distorting effects of hindsight9 would produce too great a temptation for 
courts to second-guess trial counsel's performance" based on a lifeless record. State v. 
Tennvson, 850 P.2d 461,466 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). See also Snvder, 860 
P.2d at 354: State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 OJtah App. 19941 :% 
2. Did the trial court correctly rely on a drug enforcement agent's --«?•• { 
testimony in finding that defendant had possession of a black box 
found to contain crack cocaine? s 
"We review the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to
 { 
suppress under a clearly erroneous standard.... We review the trial court's conclusions 
based on the totality of those facts for correctness." State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 1226-
27 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted); see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 
(Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 
403,405 (Utah App. 1994);. i 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides as follows: ^ 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a < 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. 
2 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I U It IU! mi was clian I'd w ith oiu i oiml ol dlegall possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute. The offense occurred within 1,000 feet of a park, and 
was a first-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998). 
Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Suppress evidence (R. 160-81) Af ter a 
hearing, ihc trial i ouil denied the motion «K IH2-8S, hil a! KKi Delanlanl snhset|iiently 
pled guilty to second-degree felony illegal possession of a controlled substance (R. 201). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to one to 15 years in prison (R. 224-25). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 229-30,232). 
• •• S I A rEMEN' 
\ s Agent Sean Hamblin lead a team of narcotics agents toward the door of an 
Ogden crack house, he saw a man peering out of the window (R. 261 at 4). Knowing that 
the drugs the officers were after could quickly disappear into the septic system, he yelled 
out to his fellon of fleets thai someone had seen Ihetu ll< Jhl ai >) . • :-• , 
1 he officers moved fast. Hamblin kicked the door, and Agent Troy Burnett, right 
behind him, hit it with a battering ram (R. 261 at 5).2 The door flew open (id.). Hamblin 
headed immediately toward the back of the house, hoping to secure the bathroom before 
^ i c facts are taken from the suppression hearing transci ipt (R 261) 
2In strike-force parlance, Hamblin, being the first officer to the door, was the 
"screen," and Burnett, who wielded the battering ram, was the "key" (R. 261 at 56). 
3 
anyone inside flushed the drugs (R. 261 at 6, 28). Five to ten other officers charged 
through the door after him (R. 261 at 10, 23). r 
Agent Burnett shouted, "Police search warrant, I want to see your hands. Get 
down on the floor" (R. 261 at 31). Burnett and Agent Nathan Jensen covered the living 
room (R. 261 at 29). Burnett was familiar with the layout of the rooms, having 
participated in a raid on the house two months earlier (R. 281 at 24).
 : 
When Jensen saw Burnett sweep to the left side of the room, he automatically ^ ( 
turned to the right, in accordance with his training in conducting drug raids (R. 261 at 58). 
Jensen saw defendant sitting on a couch at the end of the room with a black object in his 
left hand (R. 59). Believing the object might be a weapon, the officer "fixated" on the 
object (R. 261 at 59-60). The officer recalled that "[a]s I'm coming in, I'm ordering him . 
to the ground" (R. 261 at 60). Defendant immediately complied (R. 261 at 62). In 
Jensen's words, "He's got [the object] in his hand. He stands up and (inaudible) he goes 
to the ground and he kind of drops it and throws it and it rolls . . . off to his left near the * 
edge of the coffee table" (R. 261 at 60, 75). Jensen walked around to the front of 
defendant to make sure he could see defendant's hands and to determine whether the , 
object was a weapon (R. 261 at 61). Jensen realized that the object, which lay one or two 
feet from defendant's hand, was a box (id). 
Jensen called out "Finder!" to alert Burnett that he had found something (R. 261 at 
63). Burnett was the designated "finder" during the search (R. 261 at 63). When 
< 
4 
executing a warrant, the officers did not touch evidence they located (R. 261 at 38). 
Instead,, they called out In llic lintlci who tolleital .mull in\ tTi tonal Ihr e\ \tkm i 
refolding the h H ation when; it w as found (R. 261 at 38,50). The finder then turned the 
evidence over to the evidence custodian, who filled out the return of service and packaged 
the evidence for booking into police custody (R. 261 at 38, 66). Here, Jensen was the 
evidence custodian (R 261 at 56,66). 
• While JrnstTi focused on ddhidlaiii Biinielf secured three individuals who had . 
been sitting on a couch on the left side of the living room (R. 261 at 29-30). Quentin 
Jones and two females obeyed Burnett's orders to hit the ground (R. 261 at 31, 33). 
Burnett handcuffed Jones (K 
• Whui BiiiTiill si • ' defendai it 1/y ing on the floor 
one-and-a-half to two feet away from the black box (R. 261 at 31, 35). Jensen told 
Burnett that he saw defendant drop the box on the ground (R. 261 at 76). 
Hearing Jensen's words, defendant volunteered "It's not mine" (id.). 
Buntd! linn Lnt up flu.- box (R /('ill <il M) III was, a 2" or V h\ ,)" hin^'il plastic . 
ring or jewelry box that "clicked open" (R. 261 at 37, 61). Burnett and Jensen opened the 
box and found four to six yellowish-white rocks inside (R. 261 at 52, 64). Jensen set up 
his field-testing materials on the coffee table and found that the rocks tested positive for 
cocaiiii (R, 2d I ill IX„ fvl). , ' •' • • '••'••">• ; • •• • • - "' " . . - . - . 
5 
Agent Hamblin found Shelly Perks in the bedroom (R. 261 at 7). She told him she 
was in the house to smoke crack and that she had purchased one rock from "Randolph" 
(R. 261 at 7, 16). N o one else in the home was named Randolph (R. 261 at 7,35). 
Burnett took Quentin Jones outside to question him. Jones said he had jus t bought crack 
from defendant (R. 261 at 34). When Burnett asked where defendant kept the drugs, 
Jones replied "He has this little black container" (id,). ±*v. 
Jensen filled out a booking sheet and probable cause statement in preparation for 
transporting defendant to jail (R. 261 at 40, 66). Defendant asked what he would be * 
charged with (R. 261 at 40) . When told that he would be charged with possession of the 
contents of the box, defendant reiterated "Tha t ' s not my fucking b o x " (id.). 
Defendant told the officer he did not live at the crack house. He did not claim to . 
own or lease it (R. 261 at 68 , 70) . 
In his Motion to Suppress, defendant argued that no evidence existed to show he 
owned, leased, or lived at the crack house. (R. 62-63, 70). The trial court apparently 
agreed, ruling that he did not have standing to contest the search of the house (R. 184, 261 
at 87; Addendum A) . The trial court, however, ruled that he did have standing to 
question the legality of the search of the box because the box had been in his possession 
(id.). However , the court reasoned, the search was lawful because the officers were 
authorized to search for drugs in any places where they might be found (R. 261 at 88, 
Addendum A) . Therefore, the court ruled, the warrant was broad enough to encompass 
6 
the search of the box (id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. In accordance with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
Court should decline to reach defendant's claims because defendant has failed to support 
them with argument or applicable authority. 
I1! in (ill I I  I  I kdendani asserts that tie was denied effeetne assistance of coi insel 
because his trial attorney did not file a motion to suppress, and neither supported 
defendant's pro se motion with a memorandum nor replied to the state's memorandum in 
opposition. Defendant has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance. 
Hi si defendant » .innut slum lhal Ihe onleonie ol the piocmlin^ HuiiU! have been 
different if counsel had not committed the alleged errors. Here, there was no reasonable 
likelihood of success on a motion to suppress premised on any arguable grounds. Second, 
failure to file a futile motion does not constitute deficient performance. Since a 
suppression motion could nnl ha\c <aieceeded in an e\enl dial t ounsel did null deuv 
defendant effective assistance. 
Point III. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that defendant had 
possession of the black box because only one officer testified that defendant was holding 
,i bhttk object nihil, n Ihe officers bursl mln llie mom Although defendant siali's Ilia! Illu 
officers' testimony was in conflict, the record demonstrates the contrary. Finally, 
although defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Officer Jensen's 
7 
testimony that defendant had the object in his hand, he states no basis to conclude that the 
testimony was inadmissible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
Defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his v 
attorney failed to file a suppression motion. Appellant's Brief at 9. However, he does not *T{ 
identify any issues which defense counsel should have asserted. In addition, he claims 
that the trial court should have suppressed officers' test imony that defendant was in — 
possession of the black box containing crack cocaine. Appel lant ' s Brief at 12. However , 
defendant fails to state why the testimony should have been suppressed. Defendant has 
i 
failed to support either of his claims with intelligible argument or relevant authority. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's 
argument to contain the "contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the < 
issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on." Utah's appellate courts have consistently declined to address inadequately . 
briefed issues because "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party 
i 
may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439,450 
(Utah 1988) (overruled in part on other grounds) (quoting Williamson v. OpsahL 416 
8 
i 
N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 198H): see also Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 P.2d 197, 199 
(Utah App. 1996). "Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed 
arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998); see also State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) (declining to address argument on the ground 
that defendant's brief "wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support his argument"). 
Because defendant has failed to support his claims with argument or pertinent 
authority, the Court should decline to address them. 
POINTII 
DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO FILE, OR TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S FILING OF, A FUTILE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently because he failed to 
file a motion to suppress evidence, or to support defendant's pro se motion to suppress by 
filing a supporting memorandum or a memorandum in reply to the State's response 
opposing his motion. Appellant's Brief at 6. However, defendant does not specify what 
his trial counsel should have asserted as grounds for the motion, and does not show that 
counsel's alleged failures affected the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, defendant 
has failed to meet the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
9 
Under the Strickland test, 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial. 
State v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954,958 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. Montes. 804 P.2d 543, 
545 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687). 
Defendant bears the burden of establishing ineffectiveness of counsel by 
"demonstrable, not speculative" proof. State v. Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982). 
See also Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983). Moreover, although 
determination of whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel is a matter 
of law which ordinarily is reviewed for correctness, appellate review of trial counsel's 
performance must be "highly deferential in order to prevent the temptation to second-
guess counsel's actions based on a lifeless record." State v. Snyder. 860 P.2d 351, 354 
(Utah App. 1993); see also State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Cosev. 873 p.2d 1177,1179 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461,466 
(Utah App. 1993). 
To succeed in an ineffective assisstance of counsel claim, defendant must 
overcome a "strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate." State v. 
Lovell. 1999 UT 40,146, 984 P.2d 382, 392; see also Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689; State 
10 
v. Tavlor. 947 P.2d 681,685 (Utah 1997). "Given the arduous nature of the defendant's 
burden, ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely succeed." State v. Snvder, 860 
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). 
A. Defendant Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudice, 
In cases where it is "easier to dispose of an ineffective claim on the ground of lack 
of sufficient prejudice,... that course should be followed." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697; 
see also State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439,441 (Utah 1996); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 523 (Utah 1994). To establish the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim, 
defendant must show that "but for the deficient representation, there is a 'reasonable 
probability' that the result would have been different." State v. HalL 946 P.2d 712, 719 
(Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). "Prejudice 
will be held to exist only where the error undermines our confidence in the verdict against 
the defendant." State v. Snvder. 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, the Court 
must decide if a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been more 
favorable to defendant had trial counsel filed a motion to suppress, a memorandum 
supporting defendant's pro se motion to suppress, or a reply to the state's memorandum 
in opposition to defendant's motion to suppress. 
In State v. SeeL 827 P.2d 954,958-59 (Utah App. 1992), this Court rejected the 
defendants' claim that the trial counsel's failure to file a motion to sever the charge of 
11 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person, which requires proof that a defendant has a 
prior record of a felony conviction, constituted ineffective assistance. Although the Court 
felt the motion would probably have been granted if counsel had made a motion to sever 
the charges requiring proof of prior crimes, the court nevertheless denied defendants' 
claim of ineffective assistance because defendants did not provide a "persuasive 
explanation of how severing the different charges would likely have produced a different 
outcome." Id at 958. VA. * U 
Here, defendant has not shown that counsel's filing of a motion, memorandum or 
reply would have resulted in the suppression of any evidence. In fact, the record indicates 
that the trial court conscientiously considered every conceivable argument in favor of 
suppression- even arguments defendant did not raise.3 Given the court's careful 
consideration of the issues, defendant fails to present in his brief any basis to conclude 
that he was demonstrably prejudiced by filing the motion himself rather than being 
assisted by trial counsel. Even if counsel had performed as defendant suggests he should < 
have performed, a different outcome would not have resulted. 
• < 
: i 
defendant's motion focused on the admissibility of $ 182 removed from his 
pockets, and on the fact that he did not reside at the crack house (R. 60-63, 68, 70, 76). 
Defendant did not challenge the admissibility of the black box or the officers' testimony. 
The trial court reached those issues despite defendant's failure to raise them (R. 184-85). ^ 
12 
I 
B. Defendant Has Not Shown that Trial Counsel Performed Deficiently, 
To establish that trial counsel performed deficiently, "the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy.'" State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973,977 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 689)). In that vein, "failure of counsel to make motions or objections which 
would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." Parsons. 871 P.2d at 
525 (citation omitted) (counsel's failure to move for formal discovery does not show 
prejudice). See also State v. Chacon. 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) (counsel's stipulating 
to the admissibility of the evidence recovered at crime scene was not ineffective 
assistance because objection would have been futile); State v. Buel. 700 P.2d 701, 703 
(Utah 1985) (counsel's failure to challenge chain of custody was not ineffective 
assistance because the issue was not meritorious and objection would have been futile) 
Malmrose. 649 P.2d at 59 (trial counsel's failure to object to admission of testimony was 
not ineffective assistance because doing so would have been futile); State v. Wright. 765 
P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1988) (failure to object to the admissibility of blood sample and 
blood test results was not ineffective assistance because objection would have been 
futile). 
In State v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1992), the defendants claimed counsel 
was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle as 
13 
a result of the allegedly illegal stop, arrest, and search. This Court denied the defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim stating "defendants have mentioned no basis for filing a 
motion to suppress that would support granting that motion." Id, at 960. 
Here, as in Seel defendant states no basis for filing a motion to suppress that 
would support suppression. Defendant simply states that "[wjith the heavy burden on the 
Defendant to successfully prepare . . . a motion to suppress, it was ineffective assistance 
of counsel to necessitate the defendant to prepare his own motion to suppress. Further, 
defense counsel was ineffective in not preparing and filing either a memorandum 
supporting the defendant's pro se motion to suppress evidence . . . or a reply 
memorandum to the State's memorandum opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss 
[sic]." Appellant's Brief at 9. Defendant fails to show that a motion to suppress filed by 
trial counsel and based on any grounds would have been successful. 
In short, defendant fails to meet his burden to show that defense counsel's 
performance was objectively unreasonable. 
POINTIII 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE BLACK BOX AND CORRECTLY 
ADMITTED OFFICER JENSEN'S TESTIMONY ON THAT POINT 
Defendant asserts that "[t]he Trial Judge in stating that it is clear that the 
Defendant had the box in his possession was mistaken as no officer ever testified to this. 
. . . When the Court chose to believe the testimony of Officer Jensen over Officer Burnett 
14 
it was not a logical assumption." Appellant's Brief at 11. Defendant suggests that since 
Agent Burnett, who entered the house before Agent Jensen, did not testify that he saw the 
black object in defendant's hand, his testimony was necessarily in conflict with Agent 
Jensen's testimony that he saw the object in defendant's hand. Id Defendant further 
maintains that the trial court committed error in failing to suppress Agent Jensen's 
testimony that defendant had the box in his hand when the officers entered the house.4 
4The heading of Point II of defendant's brief is titled "The Trial Court Committed 
Reversible Error When it Ruled that the Defendant had no Standing to Contest the Search 
Warrant, but that Evidence Obtained by Execution of the Search Warrant May be 
Introduced into Evidence, the Weight of the Evidence to be Determined by the Jury." 
Appellant's Brief at 10. However, the text of defendant's Point II does not discuss 
standing. Instead, it appears to be devoted to whether the trial court erred in finding that 
defendant had possession of the box where the officers' testimony was "in conflict" on 
that point. Appellant's Brief at 11-12. 
Since the State is unable to discern the nature of defendant's claims regarding 
standing, the State is unable to meaningfully address such claims. However, it is clear 
that the trial court correctly determined that defendant had no standing to contest the 
search of the house. Where a defendant has neither a proprietary or possessory interest, 
nor an expectation of privacy in the thing searched, there is no standing to challenge the 
police action. Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128, 134(1978). See also United State v. 
Moffet. 84 F.3d 1291, 1293 (10th Cir. 1996). In order to assert any expectation of privacy 
in the items seized, there must be "at least a claimed right to possession in the property" 
in order to grant standing to challenge the legality of the search. State v. Constantino. 
732 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1987). 
As the trial court held, defendant did not have standing to question the legality of 
the search of the house because he did not live at the house or have any proprietary or 
possessory interest in the house. Defendant does not appear to challenge the trial court's 
ruling that the black box was lawfully searched because the item was within the scope of 
the search warrant (R. 185,261 at 88). However, the trial court could have upheld the 
search on the alternative ground that the black box was lawfully searched because 
defendant abandoned it by denying that it was his. Defendant had no expectation of 
privacy in abandoned property. U.S. v. Garzon. 119 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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Appellant's Brief at 12. 
Contrary to defendant's statements, the testimony of Agent Jensen and Agent 
Burnett was not in conflict, and the trial court did not "choose to believe the testimony of 
Officer Jensen over Officer Burnett," as defendant alleges. Appellant's Brief at 11. 
Viewed in the context of the execution of the search warrant, the officers' testimony is 
perfectly consistent. The fact that Agent Burnett did not see defendant with the black box -
in his hand merely reflects the fact that Agent Jensen was the only officer focused on -
defendant. 
When the officers executed the warrant, they did not simply enter the house and 
stand gawking. Instead, the record shows that each officer immediately embarked on a 
separate task. Agent Hamblin went straight down the hall toward the bathroom. (R. 261 
at 28). Agent Burnett made an immediate left-hand turn to cover the three individuals 
sitting on the couch on the left side of the room (R. 261 at 28-29). As Agent Burnett 
made a left-hand turn, Agent Jensen directed his attention to the right where he saw 
defendant sitting on a couch with a black object in his left hand (R. 261 at 58-59). Agent 
Jensen "fixated" on the black object because he suspected it might be a weapon (R. 261 at 
59-60). He saw defendant drop or throw the black object as defendant hit the floor (R. 
261 at 60). Agent Burnett noticed defendant and the black box for the first time only after 
defendant was prostrate (R. 261 at 31-32). Agent Burnett did not see defendant with the 
black box in his hand simply because his attention was focused elsewhere. There is no 
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conflict in the officers' testimony. 
As to defendant's claim that the trial court should have suppressed Agent Jensen's 
testimony that he saw defendant holding the black object later found to contain crack 
cocaine, defendant has failed to state any basis for suppression. No basis is even arguable 
from the record. 
In sum, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant was in possession of the 
black box, and did not err in admitting Agent Jensen's testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ) 7 ^ day of ftl\/XApft^ 
2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
C ^MkOAAKA^ M . ^WJVTSA 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Addendum A 
BRENDA J. BEATON, UBN 6832 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, , ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH ggg, .»7 »S9 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, | 
VS. '' \ 
RANDOLPH CARPENTER 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 981903734 
Judge W. BRENT WEST 
The Court, after reviewing the motions, hearing testimony from Agents Hamblin, Burnett and 
Jensen and receiving argument from the State, hereby makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On August 13 and 14,1998, a night-time, no-knock search warrant was issued for a residence 
located at 2534 Orchard #1 because agents of the Weber/Morgan Narcotics Strike Force 
believed cocaine was being sold there. The warrant did not list any particular people to be 
searched. Agent Nate Jensen ("Agent Jensen") wrote the search warrant. Judge Parley R. 
Baldwin initially reviewed the warrant. Later the next day, Judge Stanton M. Taylor reviewed 
the search warrant again because Agent Jensen did not include the night-time provisions. 
1 W*j 
Agent Troy Burnett ("Agent Burnett") was familiar with the layout of the home because he 
had been to the apartment on a prior occasion with Agent Mike Donehoo. Before executing 
the search warrant, the agents reviewed the layout of the home and set up a general plan for 
entering the apartment. ^ 
When the agents executed the search warrant on August 14,1998 at approximately 
9:30 p.m., Agent Shawn Hamblin ("Agent Hamblin") noticed an African-American male 
peeking out the livingroom window. Agent Hamblin alerted the other agents that someone 
in the house had seen them approaching. Agent Hamblin quickly approached the front door. 
He kicked the door while Agent Burnett used the battering ram to break down the door. 
Agent Hamblin entered the apartment first and immediately went toward the rear of the 
apartment where the bathroom and bedroom are located. 
Agent Burnett's attention was directed at the individuals seated on the north west couch. 
Quinton Jones and two females were sitting on the couch. Jones appeared to be shoving 
something under the cushions of the couch. 
Agent Jensen's attention was directed to another couch located against the west wall where 
the Defendant had been sitting. 
Agent Anthony Hanson ("Agent Hanson") went directly to the bathroom area of the home. 
While the Defendant was in the process of getting on the ground, Agent Jensen noticed a 
black box in his left hand. Agent Jensen saw the Defendant throw the small black box. The 
black box was located approximately one to two feet from the Defendant's left hand near the 
coffee table. 
2 
Agent Jensen called for Agent Burnett who was the designated finder for that search. Agent 
Burnett noted the box was approximately one foot in front of the Defendant's outstretched 
arms. 
Prior to the search of the box, the Defendant told Agent Jensen the box was not his. Either 
Agent Burnett or Jensen opened the box and found it contained various yellow rocks that 
were later determined to be cocaine. 
After the search of the box, the Defendant told Agent Burnett "that fucking box is not mine." 
The Defendant's name was found on written documents located in the bedroom. 
None of the other individuals found in the home live at the residence. The agents did not find 
any personal effects or documents for any of the other people located in the home. 
Agent Hamblin interviewed Shelly Perkes at the home. She told Agent Hamblin she had 
come to the house to purchase and use crack cocaine. She told Agent Hamblin that she 
purchased a rock of cocaine from a male in the house named "Randolph." The Defendant is 
the only person in the home with the name "Randolph." 
Agent Burnett spoke with Quinton Jones out on the front porch. Agent Burnett was already 
aware of the contents of the black box when he talked to Jones. Jones stated that he bought 
two rocks from "Randolph" shortly before the agents entered the home. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Defendant does not have standing to contest the search of the home. 
The Defendant has standing to contest the search of the box because it was seen in his hand. 
3 
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3, The search warrant permitted the officers to search any object that could possibly contain 
cocaine or paraphernalia. The box fell within the scope of the search warrant. 
4. The agents' search of the black box was proper. 
On February 12,1999, this Court denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence 
found in the black box. This matter is continued for February 17,1999 at 9:00 a.m. for the setting 
of a jury trial. 
DATED this J ! l ! l . day of February, 1999. 
fo-EgfaS-
JUDGE W. BRENT WEST 
Second Judicial District Court 
Prepared by: 
r^imna Q 
/ Brenda J. Beaton / [ 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
John Caine 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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whole speech? Thank you. We'll submit it. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court is prepared to 
rule on the matter. The issue of standing in regards to 
the house seems to me to be fairly clear. I'm of the 
opinion that Mr. Carpenter, based on what I've heard, did 
not, would not have standing to question the search of 
the home in this particular situation. 
In regards to the item of the black box, it is 
a difficult situation. It is unclear whether or not he 
is the owner of the box. It is clear that he had the 
box in his possession. The search occurred immediately 
after his possession of the box. I think that gives him 
standing to question the legality of that particular 
search. 
On the other hand, though, I do agree with you, 
Ms. Beaton, it becomes a factual issue as to whether or 
not the State can, in fact, prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he possessed that with the intent to 
distribute as it's been indicated there and I think it's 
an issue that does go to the jury. 
Looking at the Motion to Suppress, the officer 
testified that Mr. Carpenter had that box in his hand. 
He told him to hit the ground, he hit the ground and 
whether he cast it aside or whether it came out of his 
hand when he hit the ground or whatever, the box rolled 
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out, it was about a foot, a foot and a half away. The 
officers then went over, explored and looked inside the 
box. 
I am of the opinion that the search warrant was 
broad enough, they were at this house to look 
particularly for objects that could have contained drugs. 
They did not search Mr. Carpenter because they didn't 
have any ability to search persons that they were 
expected to find. They were entitled to search objects. 
They searched the box pursuant to a warrant that allowed 
them to be there and inside it they found cocaine. I 
think it simply is the Motion to Suppress is denied. I 
do think it's a factual issue that goes to the jury as to 
whether or not Mr. Carpenter possessed that sufficiently-* 
to show an intent to distribute. 
Ms. Beaton, you'll prepare the Findings of 
Facts, Conclusions of Law and the denial of the Motion is 
suppressed. 
MS. BEATON: I will. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. BEATON: Your Honor, we need to set this for 
jury trial. I don't have the trial schedule. 
MR. CAINE: Can we, I don't either. Can we put 
this on the calendar for Wednesday and then we'll come 
over and then we can set the trial date. 
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